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ABSTRACT
National critical infrastructure and industrial processes are heavily
reliant on automation, monitoring and control technologies,
including the widely used Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The growing interconnection of
these systems with corporate networks exposes them to cyber
attacks, with several security incidents reported over the last few
decades. This study provides a classification scheme for
categorising security incidents related to critical infrastructure and
industrial control systems. The classification scheme is applied to
analyse 242 security incidents on critical infrastructure and
industrial control networks, which were reported between 1982
and 2014. The results show interesting patterns, with key points
highlighted for the purpose of improving the way we plan for and
direct efforts toward protecting critical infrastructure and
industrial networks.

CCS Concepts
• Information systems applications ➝ Process control
systems
• Security in hardware ➝ Hardware security
implementation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern industrialised societies are fast becoming heavily
dependent on automation and control. On the one hand, the large
and complex network of highly interconnected infrastructure
assets such as electricity grids, water distribution systems and
transportation facilities must be adequately monitored and
controlled in order to optimally serve their intended purpose of
enabling the flow of goods and essential services within urban and
regional settings [1]. On the other hand, the industrial processes
that generate economic prosperity for the society must be
supported with automation and control technologies in order to
safely attain optimal desired outcomes [2]. Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems provide the needed
monitoring and control capabilities for real-time operations of
these critical infrastructures and industrial control networks [3].
Historically, SCADA systems have been designed to operate in
standalone networks, completely insulated from the corporate
network [3]. However, with growing competition and increased
pressure to reduce cost and improve operational efficiency, the
need to share information with corporate business units as well as
perform maintenance routines remotely has resulted in widespread
interconnections of SCADA systems with corporate networks that

are remotely accessible through the internet [4]. This growing
practice, in combination with progress in using standard
networking protocols for SCADA communications, has resulted
in increased exposure of national critical infrastructure and
industrial control systems to cyber attacks [5]. Consequently,
there have been several reports of security incidents on critical
infrastructure and industrial control systems, many of which lead
to significant loss from economic, public safety and
environmental standpoints [3].
Understanding the various dimensions of these security incidents
and how they have evolved over time can indubitably provide
insight for developing effective strategies to prevent or mitigate
similar attacks in the future [5]. On this basis, Miller and Rowe
[5] attempted to sample and classify past records of cyber attacks
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems. They
classified attacks based on source sectors, method of operation,
impact, and target sectors [5]. While their study contributes
significantly in helping to understand the nature of previous cyber
attacks on SCADA systems, the range of options considered in
their classification scheme and the limited number of incidents
(15) surveyed limits the ability to gain deeper insight into trends
and patterns related to previous security incidents [5].
In the current study, an attempt is made to address this gap by
presenting a more comprehensive analysis of previous security
incidents on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems,
both in terms of the range of options considered in classifying
attacks and the number of incidents sampled. A total of 242
reported security incidents on critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems are surveyed and analysed based on a proposed
classification scheme presented in the following methodology
section.

2. METHODOLOGY
This study was carried out using publicly available data from the
Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) online database
[6]. The data set covers industrial security incidents reported to
have affected process control, industrial automation or SCADA
systems within the period of 1982 to 2014 [6]. The data set
remains one of the richest so far for understanding historical
accounts of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems worldwide. At the time of this report, the database
contains 242 security incidents related to critical infrastructure
and industrial control systems, most of which are confirmed to be
correct. Attributes of the data include title, year, industry type,
country/region, and a brief description of the incident, including
its impact. The entire data set was analysed in order to show
patterns and highlight key points that can be useful for how we

plan and direct efforts toward protecting critical infrastructure and
industrial control systems (ICS).
To ensure a structured analysis, incidents were classified
according to the “intent”, “method of operation” and “perpetrator”
of the attack.

2.1 Intent
This is the purpose for the attack as gleaned from the incident
report. Based on the description of incidents, intent was classified
into 7 categories namely theft, service disruption, unintended
service disruption, sabotage, espionage, accident, and unknown.
Theft: This is theft of computers and other sensitive information
such as intellectual property, trade secrets and other financial
assets.
Service disruption: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the
attacker is to cause disruption, including delay and shutdown of
services. The motivation to cause service disruption varies and
can sometimes be due to the desire to expose the degree of
vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. Based on incidents
reported, service disruption could last from a couple of hours to
few weeks.
Unintended service disruption: This covers incidents that results
in accidental disruption to services. Based on incidents reported,
unintended service disruption could also last from a couple of
hours to few weeks.
Sabotage: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the attacker
is to deliberately cause damage to industrial control facilities or
critical infrastructure networks.
Espionage: This refers to attacks wherein the attacker, often state
sponsored, sets out to spy and collect information for political and
military advantages.
Accident: This refers to attacks wherein the intent of the attacker
is to cause accidents within industrial or critical infrastructure
networks.
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the purpose was
unknown.

2.2 Method of operation
Based on the classification of cyber attacks adopted in previous
studies [7], [ 8], each reported incident was categorised into one
of six methods of operation, namely malware, unathorised insider
access, unathorised remote access, interruption of services, noncyber attack, and unknown.
Malware: These are cyber-attacks that are carried out using
malicious software. In order to infect the targeted network with
malware, attackers often rely on the use of common techniques
such as social engineering, phishing, and compromised removable
media and personal laptops belonging to employees and vendors.
Unathorised insider access: This is when an insider (e.g.
employee, vendor or contractor) gains access to computer
resources in the corporate or industrial control network without
the required permission. This type of attack can be carried out
through different means including stolen credential, misuse of
privilege, brute-force, and backdoor exploits.
Unathorised remote access: This is when an attacker remotely
gains access to computer resources in the corporate or industrial
control network without the required permission. This type of
attack can also be carried out through stolen credential, bruteforce, social engineering, and backdoor exploits.
Interruption of services: These types of attacks are aimed at
interrupting or possibly shutting down essential services provided
by industrial control systems and critical infrastructure networks.
An example is denial-of-service attack, where the attacker aims to
make the network unavailable [9]. Another example is jamming,

where the radio frequencies that networked computers use for
their wireless communication are interfered with [9].
Non-cyber attack: In industrial control systems, component failure
(e.g. programmable logic controller), software bugs and computer
malfunction or glitches can potentially result in the shutdown of
crucial services. Incidents of this type are referred to as non-cyber
attacks in this study.
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the mode of
operation is unknown.

2.3 Perpetrator
Perpetrator refers to the alleged attacker responsible for the
reported incident. In this study, perpetrators are categorised into
lone hacker, organised hacking group, vendor, employee,
unknown, and none.
Lone hacker: This includes any unaffiliated individual engaging
in the cyber attack of critical infrastructure and industrial control
systems on their own accord. Script kiddies, criminals and
protesting members of the society often fall into this group.
Organised hacking group: These are highly motivated and well
funded hacking groups. Examples include terrorist groups, hostile
governments,
Vendor: This includes security vendors, suppliers and contractors.
Employee: This refers to disgruntled or greedy employees who
attack their own employer’s system.
Unknown: This covers all other attacks in which the perpetrator is
unknown.
None: This covers non-cyber attacks presented above, i.e.,
situations in which no one has deliberately launched a cyber
attack on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in this
section. Table 1 shows the number of incidents reported for each
country. Europe appears in the list because of two reports of
attacks on European facilities in 2003. About 17 countries
recorded just one reported security incident. Others recorded
more, with the United States topping the list followed by the
United Kingdom. One may quickly interpret these results to be
that the United States and the United Kingdom are the most
vulnerable to cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems. However, given that the quality and
completeness of records in the RISI repository are subject to
people’s willingness to report security incidents, it could well be
that the reason for the high level of incidents in the United States
and the United Kingdom is because institutions are more open to
share security incidents in these two countries or that the RISI
data collection campaign is stronger in these countries.
Table 1. Number of reported incidents per country/region
Country or region
Brazil, Chad, Germany, Guam, Guyana,
Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, The
Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela
France, India, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand,
South Africa, Europe
Iran, Russia
Switzerland
Japan
Australia
Canada
Unknown
United Kingdom
United States

Reported incident
1

2
3
4
5
12
14
16
32
123

Figure 1 shows the number of reported incidents for different
critical infrastructure networks and industry types. Transportation
topped the list (48), followed by Power and Utilities (45),
Petroleum (36) and Water/Waste Water (31) in that order. Mining
(1) and Pharmaceutical (2) were the least impacted by security
incidents. One reason for the high level of attacks on
transportation systems could be because of the many avenues to
perpetrate such attacks- from road network (e.g. road signs
attacks) to rail and air traffic systems; the reliance on automation
and control systems creates many avenues for cyber attacks.
Secondly, the wide geographical distribution and the huge impact
associated with their failures make them attractive to cyber
attackers. Same is true for the Power and Utilities sector. It should
be noted that based on reports in the data set, the industry type,
“Other” is observed to include facilities such as roller coasters,
amusement park rides, hospitals, emergency services, military,
etc.

3.1 Key observations from the results







Figure 1. Number of reported incidents per industry type
The number of incidents reported for each year covered in the
data set is shown in Figure 2. The highest number of security
incident was recorded in 2003 (36), followed by 2009 (23), 2004
(22), and 2012 (19) in that order. A closer observation of reports
within the data set shows rise in malware attacks from 2000,
which peaked in 2003. After 2003, reported incidents dropped
steadily until 2008. The reason for the drop cannot be gleaned
from the data set.





Figure 2. Number of incidents per year

The first reported security incident on industrial control
systems was in 1982, in which a Siberian gas pipeline
exploded as a result of a Trojan that doubled its usual
pressure. Though some sources claim that the explosion is
due to poor construction and not malware, this incident is
still recognised in the literature as the first reported cyber
security attack on industrial control systems [5].
More than half of all cyber attacks on critical infrastructure
and industrial control systems (Figure 3) are aimed at
causing service disruption. Attackers may adopt different
methods of operation such as malware (e.g. worms, Trojans,
viruses), unathorised access, and denial-of-service attacks in
order to cause service disruption. Jamming (e.g. infrared and
electromagnetic interference) also featured as a source of
service disruption to critical infrastructure systems. Two
reported cases of service disruption within the data set, i.e.,
the 14-year old school boy who hacked into Poland’s tram
system in 2008 and the 1999 Shut down of SCADA Systems
in San Diego’s water and energy facilities, involved the use
of infrared remote control and electro mangnetic
interference from a NAVY AN/SPS 49 radar operating off
the coast of San Diego respectively.
An Attack on a given infrastructure or industrial control
facility may originate from multiple sources, making the
tasks of mitigation and attribution difficult. A recent
example reported within the data set is the 2014 German
Steel Mill cyber attack, wherein multiple attackers
succeeded in causing massive damage by putting a furnace
in an undefined condition, so that it could not be shut down
in the regular fashion.
Many attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial control
systems start by first gaining access to the corporate
network before progressing to the control system
network. This implies that while ICS and SCADA-specific
security measures are crucial for the protection of critical
infrastructure and industrial control systems, traditional
approaches such as firewall, demilitarized zones, antivirus,
intrusion detection and prevention, access control and
authentication mechanisms must be put in place as the first
set of security layers.
Unauthorised access can occur remotely or through an
insider. The results (Figure 4) have shown that insiders pose
a similar risk of unauthorised access (8.26%) as do remote
cyber attackers (8.68%). Adequate security policies and
control must therefore be put in place to prevent insiders
such as employees, vendors and contractors from gaining
unauthorised access to computer resources.
Figure 5 shows that approximately 66% of security incidents
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems are
caused by unknown perpetrators while 17% are not caused
by a perpetrator. Security incidents that are not caused by a
perpetrator are likely to be non-cyber attacks. Non-cyber
attacks constitute approximately 33% of security incidents
on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems.
Typical examples of factors observed to have resulted in
non-cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems include lightning strike, inappropriate
security practices (e.g. installation of incompatible antivirus
and software patches in SCADA systems, unintended
consequences from penetration testing and IT audits, etc.),
incorrect network configuration, and poor management
practices (e.g. incorrect network configuration, poor
maintenance and upgrade of aged software and hardware











components resulting in system failure, inadequate staff
training, incorrect programming of PLC controllers, etc.).
These factors, amongst others, are also some of the reasons
for the high record of unintended service disruption (18%)
as shown in Fig 3.
Approximately 5% of security incidents on critical
infrastructure and industrial control systems are established
to be caused by organised hacking groups (Figure 5). Some
well-known hacking groups allegedly named as responsible
for some of the reported cyber attacks includes the Anti
Christ Doom Squad, Comment Group, Cutting Sword of
Justice, Dragonfly, and Sun Hacker.
Figure 4 shows that the method of operation for
approximately 20% of security incidents on critical
infrastructure and industrial control systems are unknown.
This is a significant issue because the ability to protect
systems from cyber attacks is degraded without adequate
knowledge of the adversaries and their methods of
operation.
Common vulnerabilities exploited in many of the incidents
reported includes uninstalled or outdated antivirus,
inadequate firewall protection, lax physical security, use of
weak or default passwords, inadequate security policies,
poorly management backdoors, loopholes in ICS and
SCADA products, employees as weak links in the security
chain (e.g. the use of social engineering as well as the
introduction of malware into the corporate network though
connected personal laptops and USB sticks), poorly secured
VPN access and other known vulnerabilities that are often
associated with web services and windows systems.
Some of the malware that have been successfully used
against critical infrastructure and industrial control systems
include Shamoon virus, Mariposa virus, Conficker virus,
Stuxnet, PE_SALITY virus, W32.Virut.CF virus, Mytob
worm, Ahack worm, Generic Backdoor.k Trojan, Zotob/PnP
Worms, Spybot, W32/Korgo Worm, Sasser worm (rampant
in 2004), Nachi/Welchia Worm, MUMU worm, Blaster
virus (rampant in 2003), Nacchi virus, SQLslammer Worm,
Sobig Virus, Nimda virus, Code Red Worm and the Remote
Explorer. These malware, in addition to other SCADAspecific malware such as Flame and Duqu should be
monitored as potential threats against critical infrastructure
and industrial control systems [5].
A total of 673 deaths were recorded while the number of
injuries was well over 419. Most of the deadly incidents
reported occurred in the transportation sector. One of such
incidents is the 1997 Korean air line B747 CFIT accident
that took 228 lives as a result of a bug introduced into the
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system during a
software upgrade. Another 228 passengers also died in the
Air France flight 447 that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in
2009 due to suspected computer failure. The Spanair flight
5022 that crashed just after takeoff in 2008, killing 154
people is believed to be caused by a Trojan. In Australia, a
Qantas Airbus A330 flight that plunged suddenly after
experiencing a computer glitch in 2008 resulted in the injury
of 110 people.

Figure 3. Distribution of security incidents by intent of attack

Figure 4. Distribution of security incidents by method of
operation

Figure 5. Distribution of security incidents by type of
perpetrator
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